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Abstract
This research examines the ability of consumers to predict the appeal of complete visual patterns from small
sample fragments. In a task designed to mimic the dilemma of choosing wallpaper from small swatches, study
participants are shown fragments taken from a large pattern design and are asked to predict how attractive
they would find the complete image. Drawing on prior research on affective forecasting, predictions are
hypothesized to be driven by an anchoring‐and‐adjustment process that skews forecasts toward the
attractiveness of fragments when judged in isolation. Results from 3 laboratory studies support this basic
hypothesis: Respondents consistently overestimate the degree to which their initial reactions to fragments
predict their subsequent evaluations of wholes. The size of this projection bias is, in turn, conditioned by such
moderators as prior familiarity with product fragment, cognitive load, and visualization abilities—effects that
are consistent with an anchoring‐and‐adjustment explanation for the data.
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Biases in Predicting Preferences for the Whole from Product Fragments  
Abstract 
In this research we examine the ability of consumers to predict the likely appeal of large 
visual patterns from small sample fragments. In a task designed to mimic the dilemma of 
choosing wall paper from small swatches, study participants are shown fragments taken from a 
large pattern design and are asked to predict how attractive they would find the complete image. 
Drawing on research on affective forecasting and inference heuristics, we hypothesize that these 
predictions will be driven by an anchoring-and-adjustment process that skews predictions toward 
the local attractiveness of fragments. Results from three laboratory studies support this basic 
hypothesis: respondents consistently overestimate the degree to which their initial reactions to 
fragments predict their subsequent evaluations of wholes. The size of this projection bias is, in 
turn, conditioned by such moderators as prior familiarity with product fragment, cognitive load, 
and visualization abilities—effects that are consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment 
explanation for the data.  
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Many purchase decisions require consumers to imagine whole products from fragmentary 
images. When homeowners decide what color to paint a room they often have little more to go 
on than small color swatches provided by a retailer, fragments from which whole rooms must be 
imagined. Likewise, shoppers from apparel catalogs such as Land’s End face a similar dilemma 
of visualization: not only must they imagine what a garment and pattern would look viewed at 
full scale, but, like paint shoppers, what a depicted garment might look like given a different 
color or pattern option. Finally, even moviegoers cannot avoid the need to mentally extrapolate: 
decisions about whether to attend a movie are often made based on snippets of content contained 
in trailers or print ads.  
How skilled are consumers at predicting their reactions to product wholes from small 
fragments? While we are aware of no research that has examined this question explicitly, the 
rapid growth of computer-based consumer visualization aids suggests that, at the very least, it is 
not a task that consumers naturally perform easily or well. The Dutch Boy web site, for example, 
features a visualization tool that allows consumers to see what different paint color and trim 
combinations might look like when applied to a prototypical room; and Toyota’s Scion site 
allows consumers to assemble and view virtual cars with different combinations of body 
accessories and colors. Yet, despite the prevalence of such purchase decisions, surprisingly little 
is known about how mental extrapolation problems are solved in the absence of aids, or the kinds 
of biases with which they are associated.  
The purpose of this research is to propose and test a process model of consumer judgment 
in a class of mental extrapolation tasks where consumers view a small swatch taken from a much 
larger overall pattern (such as a wall paper or a garment) and are asked to predict their liking for 
the final composite. After a time delay they are shown the overall composite pattern and evaluate 
 4
the composite. Drawing from the recent literatures on affective forecasting and inference 
heuristics, we hypothesize that these mental extrapolation judgments will be driven by an 
anchoring-and-adjustment process that skews affective forecasts toward the initial aesthetic 
appeal of product fragments. Hence, consumers will tend to overestimate how much they will 
like large images created from small attractive fragments and dislike large images created from 
unattractive fragments. Three laboratory studies support this basic idea, as well as find evidence 
for the effect of several moderators that follow from anchoring theory. Specifically, the 
discrepancy between predicted likings and evaluations of the final product is found to be more 
pronounced when consumers have prior exposure to the fragments in different contexts or 
experience cognitive load while making predictions, and are mollified when consumers have 
strong visualization skills.  
The paper is organized in three sections. We first review the relevant background 
literatures and develop several hypotheses about the judgmental processes and accuracy in such 
extrapolation judgments. We then reports three laboratory studies testing these hypotheses, and 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of the work and suggestions for future research. 
Hedonic Prediction from Product Visualizations 
Consider the following common dilemma. A consumer has made the decision to apply a 
new wall paper to a room, and travels to the local home store to see what alternative new patterns 
might be available. While she is pleased to see the wide assortment, she observes that they are 
viewable only as small swatches in catalogs. Her decision will thus not be an easy one; beyond 
the difficulty posed by the breadth of options, the key criterion on which the choice should be 
made—how a wall paper will look once fully installed in a room at home—is not something she 
can observe. The decision will thus test her ability to accurately imagine the room at home with 
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different new wall papers and anticipate how she would affectively respond to these different 
options. 
How might she solve this mental extrapolation problem? Although there has been 
extensive research on the cognitive processing of mental images in both psychology and 
marketing, little of the work is directly related to the mental extrapolation problem considered 
here. The work on mental images in psychology has primarily dealt with the speed of generating 
and processing mental images (e.g., rotating the letter “R”; see, e.g., Kosslyn, 1994; Shepard & 
Cooper, 1982), and is not concerned with the evaluative consequences of such operations. 
Likewise, research on imagery in marketing is primarily interested in comparing cognitive 
processing of mental imagery and verbal information in product evaluations and new product 
design (see Dahl, Chattopadhyay, & Gorn, 1999; Keller & Block, 1997; MacInnis & Price, 
1987). As such, its relevance is again limited. It does not, for example, comment on the specific 
processes of visualization or its accuracy. Finally, the literature on product judgment given 
limited attribute information (e.g., Kardes, Posavac, & Cronley, 2004; Meyer, 1981; Simmons & 
Lynch, 1991) examines how product evaluations are influenced by missing attribute values. 
While this literature shares with the current research a common interest in product judgments 
under uncertainty, the focus in that work is more on how consumers form inferences about the 
value of specific attributes (e.g., unknown quality given a known price) rather than holistic 
visualization of products from fragmentary descriptions.  
In contrast, a body of work that potentially has strong relevance to the present research is 
the recent literature on affective forecasting—research that explores people’s ability to predict 
their future affective response to a focal event such as a job change (for reviews, see 
Loewenstein & Schkade,1999; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). The common finding is that when 
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making such forecasts people often overestimate how long their immediate affective reactions to 
an event will persist in the future. Hence, academics facing the prospect of being denied tenure 
underestimate their ability to rebound from disappointment, and hungry consumers find the 
prospect of eating dinner items for breakfast more attractive than satiated people (Gilbert, Gill, & 
Wilson, 2002; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). A widely accepted 
explanation is that people make forecasts using an anchoring-and-adjustment strategy that puts 
too much weight on current emotional or affective states (e.g., Kahneman & Schkade, 1999; 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000). Under anchoring theory 
projection biases are thus most acute when the event that triggers these emotions is particularly 
salient, or the task of envisioning the future is particularly difficult. As an example, Gilbert et al. 
(2002) found that the tendency for hungry people to have a strong preference for consuming 
dinner items for breakfast is exacerbated when respondents make the forecast while having to 
perform other cognitive tasks.  
Although the evidence for such anchoring biases has been drawn from contexts that are 
quite different from the mental visualization context considered here, the tasks nevertheless hold 
an obvious parallel: both involve prospective judgments about the value of an unseen larger 
epoch (in our case, a whole visual image) based on small seen component (here, a swatch or 
fragment). The major difference, of course, is that ours is a task of spatial rather than temporal 
extrapolation; we examine people’s ability to look beyond their immediate reactions to an image 
fragment to envision how they would react to a larger, more complete, image.   
Visualizations as Affective Forecasts 
 How might consumers undertake visualizations? Intuition gives rise to two major process 
hypotheses. The most straightforward is holistic mental imaging: upon viewing a fragment the 
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consumer would construct an explicit mental image of what the larger pattern would look like 
(perhaps drawing from examples in memory), much as one might try to mentally picture how a 
room at home might look adorned in a certain color while at a paint store. The consumer’s 
judgment would then be the attractiveness of this holistic image as it appears in his or her mind’s 
eye. Note that this mental construction need not be effortful: while in some cases it might indeed 
correspond to the stereotypic image of a consumer closing his or her eyes to picture a room 
painted in a certain color, in other cases the fragment might automatically trigger recall of a 
familiar completed image (such as a room painted in similar colors that one has seen before). In 
either case the predicted affect is that associated with this envisioned whole image.  
 But what if a fragment does not give rise to such a specific visualization (as might be the 
case for an unfamiliar abstract shape), or the consumer lacks good visualization skills? In such 
cases we hypothesize that the projection task would be solved using a numeric adjustment 
heuristic not unlike that used to make hedonic forecasts in other domains. That is, the consumer 
would use the attractiveness of the fragment in isolation as a starting point for the forecast and 
then adjust this valuation up or down using heuristic knowledge about how the appeal of 
complete patterns typically tends to differ from that of a fragment. For example, if a consumer is 
attracted to a wall paper swatch because it contains a finely-detailed image of a flower, he or she 
might conjecture that this appeal would be lost in a wall paper that contained many of such 
flowers, where the details and uniqueness of the fragment image would be difficult to discern.  
 Fragments as Anchors in Holistic Forecasts  
 Central to this research is a hypothesis that regardless of which of these processes 
consumers use to make forecasts—or whether they use a mixture—predicted evaluations of 
whole images from fragments will exhibit an anchoring bias similar to that which marks 
 8
affective forecasts in temporal prediction tasks. That is, initial exposure to fragments that trigger 
positive associations will lead to forecasts of the attractiveness of wholes that are too positive, 
while initial exposure to fragments that trigger negative associations will lead to forecasts that 
are too negative.  
The rationale for this hypothesis is twofold. When a consumer first sees a fragmentary 
image containing recognizable elements (such as a swatch from a flowered pattern of wall paper) 
these elements will often trigger an affective response that is independent of later-formed beliefs 
about the completed image. An example might be the spontaneous feeling of pleasure one might 
feel upon first seeing a favorite color or image (e.g., Zajonc, 1980). Even if the consumer later 
concludes that a completed image could look quite different from this fragment, prior work on 
anchoring suggests that this initial disposition will nevertheless have a sustained effect on the 
subsequent holistic judgment (e.g., Forster, 2004; Tverksy & Kahneman, 1974). In our case, this 
could occur mechanically either by making it more likely to retrieve from memory completed 
mental images that are affectively congruent with the prior disposition (e.g., envision only 
attractive rooms after being primed by an attractive color swatch) or provide numerical estimates 
of the attractiveness of wholes that are congruent with the prior (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 
1999).  
This effect would be exacerbated in the current context by comparative visual salience of 
fragments. The immediately-felt affect for a tangible fragment will tend to loom psychologically 
large compared to the imagined affect for an imagined whole, giving it more weight in any 
composite judgment (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000). Put another way, even if consumers imagine that 
their affective response to a complete image would be more tempered than that which they are 
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currently feeling about the fragment, it will be hard for them to prevent their prospective 
judgments from being colored by these immediate feelings.  
It is important to emphasize that the empirical validity of this hypothesis hinges on 
consumers having an independent affective response to fragments when they are first viewed—
responses that condition their subsequent forecast of the attractiveness of completed patterns. 
The possibility exists, of course, that no such pre-processing occurs; exposure to a fragment may 
immediately trigger a mental image of a completed pattern which becomes the focus of the 
projected valuation. Under such a process predictive accuracy would entirely depend on the 
empirical correspondence between the imagined image and the realized one, a correspondence 
that might just as easily be overly positive as overly negative. Hence, in principle, the finding of 
an anchoring effect provides joint validation of the existence of a staged constructive process as 
well as the biasing effect of this process.  
The problem with such a conclusion, however, is that judgment data that look like 
anchoring effects could arise simply as a statistical artifact of regression-to-the-mean effects in 
repeated testing, even if consumers’ forecasts are unbiased. If forecasts and subsequent 
valuations are measured with error, subsamples of consumers who show the highest and lowest 
mean predicted affect ratings at time 1 will naturally tend to have more moderate mean ratings at 
time 2—an effect that could be confused with real over- and under-prediction of affect. A more 
thorough analysis of the process that generates predicted valuations of wholes, therefore, requires 
data showing that the strength of the anchoring effect—if it exists—is conditioned by a set of 
moderators predicted by anchoring theory. These moderators will be explored in turn. 
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Moderators of Visualization Accuracy 
Fragment Familiarity. An emerging theory of the anchoring bias in recent years views 
the anchoring effect as the product of biased activation and retrieval in memory processes (e.g., 
Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). According to this anchoring-as-
activation account, the decision maker uses the anchor as a memory probe which, in turn, 
activates information that is consistent with the anchor more than the information that is 
inconsistent. In support of this account, increased elaboration of anchors leads to a stronger 
anchoring effect (Wilson et al., 1996) while directing decision maker’s attention to anchor-
inconsistent information substantially reduces the bias (Chapman & Johnson, 1999).  
A natural hypothesis that follows from such work is that if consumers make forecasts of 
the value of holistic images using a staged constructive process, we should observe a negative 
correlation between fragment familiarity and the accuracy of predictions of the attractiveness of 
completed whole images. Specifically, because more familiar fragments are likely to be the 
subject of greater cognitive elaboration (e.g., a fragment that contains images of a familiar 
location may prime memories of an enjoyable vacation), the more these cognitions will interfere 
with competing attempts to form unbiased mental images of what a completed whole images 
might look like. As such, affective reactions to the fragment will act as a stronger anchor on 
predicted valuations of the whole. 
The obvious caveat to this prediction, of course, is that such a relationship would not hold 
if the overall pattern is as familiar as the fragment itself—as might be the case for certain 
familiar prints that are uniquely recognizable from small swatches. Rather, our hypothesis 
centers on those cases where the consumer has never seen the holistic pattern made from the 
fragment.  
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Cognitive load. A closely related moderator is cognitive load. One of the major empirical 
findings of previous work on anchoring effects is that anchoring effects are exacerbated in tasks 
that impose a constraints on available cognitive capacity—such as making decision makers 
memorize numbers while formulating inferences (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2002). We thus might 
expect a similar finding here: because the task of mentally visualizing a completed image (and 
constructing a predicted valuation) requires cognitive resources, the greater the cognitive load 
that is placed on consumers when making a projective judgment, the worse their predictions 
should be on average, and the more they will tend to be anchored by the independent 
attractiveness of the fragment. To illustrate, we suggest that it is this moderator that makes the 
task of picking fabrics from large books of swatches so daunting for consumers; when trying to 
make choices consumers may be able to do little more than react to the immediate attractiveness 
of the swatches, an impression that might be quite different from that which would be formed if 
considerably more time was spent considering what each swatch would look like on a larger 
scale.  
Visualization Skills. The ability to visualize patterns obviously varies from person to 
person. While the average consumers are often helplessly confused in front of a wall of paint 
colors in Home Depot, professional interior designers have the knack to arrange furniture in their 
“mind’s eye” for maximal aesthetic appeal. The stark contrast between professional interior 
designers and the average consumers in their ability to visualize patterns and objects probably 
reflect the difference in experience and training. Even with ordinary consumers, people often 
have different preferences between visual and verbal stimuli and hence their ability to process 
each type of stimuli also differs. Visualizers and verbalizers differ in their propensity to process 
visual materials and to generate and rely on mental imagery in their decision making, and they 
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differ in their ability to process visual stimuli. If professional interior designers are a guide, we 
should expect those consumers who are more adept at processing visual stimuli to perform better 
at the visualization task and produce smaller errors than those who prefer verbal stimuli.  
Experience with visualization tasks. Finally, experience with visualization tasks is 
another factor that may have beneficial effect on forecast accuracy. A few precedents for a 
beneficial effect of task experience have been reported in the affective forecasting literature. 
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978), for example, have noted that although most 
people tend to ignore the impact of hedonic adaptation when predicting future feelings, those 
who have witnessed their friends or relatives adapting to the life of a paraplegic are more aware 
of adaptation effect in their judgments. Similarly, Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson (2005) 
effectively reduced the anchoring bias in their participants by priming them with examples of 
hedonic adaptation. We thus might expect a similar experience effect here: a consumer who 
repeatedly finds themselves being disappointed with the attractiveness of completed images (e.g., 
how a room actually looks when painted in dark blue) might well develop skills that enhance 
predictive accuracy such as by learning to ignore the initial affective signals provided by the 
fragment. Indeed, anecdotal evidence supporting such training effects is implied by the existence 
of design consultants, people whose ability to accurately anticipate the attractiveness of wholes 
from parts stems not just from innate visualization skills (as discussed above), but also sheer 
experience gained through trial and error.  
Overview of the Studies 
Three laboratory studies are reported below that explore the accuracy and processes of 
extrapolation judgments from product fragments. All three studies followed the same basic 
procedure: participants first viewed fragments taken from larger whole images, and made 
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predictions about how attractive they would find the whole. After a delay they were shown the 
completed image, and provide a rating of its holistic attractiveness. Our central interest was the 
discrepancy between predicted liking based on fragments and actual evaluations of the wholes. 
Study 1 tested the basic anchoring hypothesis while studies 2 and 3 explored the influence of 
potential moderators.  
Study 1 
Method  
Participants. Forty-six business undergraduate students at a large east coast university 
participated in the study as part of an experimental session that included other unrelated 
experiments. Each participant was paid $10 for their participation. Two participants did not 
respond to all the questions and were thus eliminated from analysis reported below, leading to an 
effective sample size of forty-four.  
Stimuli. Each participant examined a total of eighteen fragments with varying level of 
attractiveness. The fragments were selected from a large sample of patterns drawn from several 
online sources such as Microsoft’s Clip Art. Figure 1 (lower panel) provides some sample 
fragments. Since pretests with student volunteers from the same university showed a high level 
of heterogeneity regarding the perceived attractiveness of those fragments, we decided to 
measure, rather than manipulate, fragment attractiveness within-subjects.  
----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 1 about here  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Procedure. The study consisted of three phases, each separated from the others by a 5-to-
10-minute filler task. In phase 1, participants were told that they just moved in a new apartment 
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and needed to get a new wall paper for their living room. Then they were shown a series of 
fragment patterns that they were told were samples of wall papers available at a local home 
improvement store. After each fragment was shown on the computer screen, they were asked to 
rate the fragment on a 15-point scale (1 = “Very Ugly” and 15 = “Very Attractive”). In phase 2, 
the fragment was shown side by side with a sample wall paper (i.e., referent) that depicted how 
the fragment pattern would be duplicated to form the completed design (e.g., a square grid; see 
Figure 1, upper panel). Participants were then asked to predict how much they would like the 
wall paper with that fragment in their living room. These predictions were made on the same 15-
point scale as in phase 1. To minimize boredom, several sample wall papers were used and their 
pairing with the target fragments was counterbalanced. In phase 3 of the study, participants were 
shown wall papers on the computer screen which were constructed with the fragments they 
viewed earlier in phase 1. Each wall paper occupied the entire computer screen. Participants 
were asked to indicate their liking of each wall paper on the 15-point scale used in phase 1 of the 
study. All experimental materials were delivered on computer screens, and participants 
completed the study at their own pace.  
In addition to evaluative judgments, the computer program also measured the response 
time for each prediction. Our goal in measuring response times was to explore whether initial 
hedonic reactions to the fragment would influence not just the predicted liking of the whole but 
also the evaluation (or visualization) process itself. For example, prior research on response 
latencies has shown that negative stimuli often trigger faster, more automated, response 
processes (e.g., Fiske, 1980; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002). As such, we may expect shorter 
response times for unattractive fragments than for attractive ones.  
 15
Results  
Preliminaries. Mean evaluations of the fragments, predicted liking of wall papers based 
on fragments (henceforward predicted liking), and evaluation of the wall paper (henceforward 
experienced liking) can be found in Table 1. The mean rating of fragments was close to neutral 
(M = 7.03) with substantial variation both within and between participants. Their predicted liking 
of wall papers based on fragments was, on average, lower than their evaluation of the 
corresponding fragment (M = 6.34), F(1, 43) = 44.41, p < .0001, as was experienced liking (M = 
6.16), F(1, 43) = 20.57, p < .0001.  
----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 1 about here  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Influence of Fragment Attractiveness. We hypothesized that predicted likings would be 
more strongly influenced by fragment evaluations than would experienced likings. Predicted and 
experienced likings were separately regressed on fragment evaluations, after controlling for 
participant specific effects. The regression results confirmed this conjecture. Specifically, 
fragment evaluations had a strong effect on predicted liking, β = .86, t(747) = 44.81, R2 = .79. In 
contrast, the effect of fragment evaluations on experienced likings, though significant, was much 
more modest, β = .46, t(747) = 14.48, R2 = .41. The difference in β’s was highly significant, 
repeated measures F(1, 747) = 140.92, p < .0001. Not surprisingly, fragment evaluations had a 
stronger correlation with predicted likings (r = .85) than with experienced likings (r = .47), 
paired t(43) = 9.76, p < .0001, a pattern that was observed for all but two (or, 95%) participants.  
Congruence between Prediction and Evaluation of Whole Product. Next we examine the 
consistency between predicted and experienced likings. For this purpose, we calculated the 
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discrepancy as predicted liking – experienced liking. At the aggregate level, predicted liking was 
not different from experienced liking (M = .18 for discrepancy), t(791) = 1.39, p > .15. However, 
as predicted by the anchoring hypothesis, the discrepancies showed a significant positive 
relationship to fragment evaluation, β = .40, t(747) = 11.87, p < .0001, R2 = .27. In other words, 
participants were more likely to overestimate their liking for wall papers constructed from 
fragments that they found appealing, but more likely to underestimate their liking for those from 
fragments that were found to be unappealing.  
To further illustrate the effect, fragments were median split into attractive or unattractive 
as a within-subjects factor based on each participant’s own ratings. Discrepancies between 
predictions and evaluations of whole products were subjected to a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA with fragment attractiveness as the independent variable. The mean discrepancy was 
negative for unattractive fragments (M = -.91) but positive for attractive fragments (M = 1.20), 
F(1, 704) = 84.45, p < .0001. That is, compared to actual evaluations of the wholes, predictions 
were overly optimistic for attractive fragments but overly negative for unattractive ones.  
Response Time. Response time data for predicted likings were first log-transformed 
because of non-normality and then submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with 
fragment attractiveness as the independent variable. Consistent with prior work on the processing 
of negative versus positive cues (e.g., Fiske, 1980), response times were significantly longer for 
attractive fragments than for unattractive ones (M = 4.7 vs. 4.1 seconds), F(1, 704) = 6.29, p < 
.05.  
Discussion  
Study 1 provided basic support for the hypothesis that visual extrapolation judgments 
would be prone to a fragment-induced anchoring bias that parallels the projection biases found in 
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other domains of hedonic forecasting. As predicted, predictions about the overall attractiveness 
of wholes were overly influenced by the initial independent attractiveness of fragments, such that 
forecasts in response to attractive fragments proved overly optimistic and those for unattractive 
fragments proved overly pessimistic. The data also produced tentative evidence that the initial 
attractiveness of fragments also influenced the process that produced the predictions. 
Specifically, positive fragments were associated with longer response latencies, suggesting that 
participants engaged in greater mental elaboration after viewing attractive (vs. unattractive) 
fragments.  
Two concerns, however, limit the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
study. One is that the task faced by participants differed in several ways from that which 
characterizes many real-world extrapolation tasks such as choosing a real wall paper at a home 
store. While consumers will almost always have a referent context in mind when evaluating a 
fragment (e.g., their living room), it will not always be seen side-by-side with the fragment, 
hence require more active imagination (e.g., imaging how a couch or room would look like, not 
just a larger section of wall paper). More active visualization might, in turn, offset the anchoring 
effects observed here. In addition, the finding of a statistical carry-over effect between fragment 
evaluations and forecasts provides only suggestive evidence for an anchoring-and-adjustment 
process. Stronger evidence requires us to show not only that the results of the first study replicate 
in a more realistic context, but are also conditioned by moderators theorized by anchoring theory. 




The primary goals of study 2 were twofold. First, we sought to replicate the key results of 
study 1 in a more realistic task setting. Second, we sought to examine the process of 
extrapolation judgments more closely by studying the effect of fragment familiarity on the 
congruence between fragment-based predictions and evaluations of wholes. Based on the 
activation account of the anchoring bias, we hypothesized that prior familiarity or exposures to 
the fragment would reduce the congruence between predictions and whole product evaluations. 
We also used the study to remedy a possible methodological weakness of Study 1, our use of the 
same evaluation scale for both fragment evaluation and prediction. The concern is that the use of 
the same numeric scale may have artificially inflated the observed anchoring effect by enhancing 
recall of fragment evaluations at the time that holistic forecasts were made—a source of 
fragment salience that would not occur in natural settings.  
Method  
Eighty-six students from the same university as in study 1 participated in the study for 
partial course credit. Participants were told to imagine that they were buying a shirt from a 
website, and were shown a series of swatches of the fabrics that would be used to make the shirt. 
In order to more closely mimic the kinds of constraints on visualization that often arise in 
purchase contexts, unlike in Study 1 participants were not provided with a detailed illustration of 
exactly how the pattern would be arrayed in the final shirt. They were simply shown a generic 
illustration of the kind of shirt they would be buying (an illustration of a white short-sleeved 
shirt) and told that the patterns would be arrayed in a grid layout. 
The procedure closely followed that of study 1, so we only note the differences here. In 
phase 1, participants evaluated a series of pattern swatches on both their prior familiarity with 
each swatch and its attractiveness. Prior familiarity was measured on a binary scale (the question 
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asks, “Does the following fragment appear familiar to you?” with “No” and “Yes” as response 
options). Given the concern over the use of the same scales for fragment evaluations and 
predictions, the attractiveness was measured on a 7-point bipolar scale (-3 = “Very Ugly” and +3 
= “Very Attractive”; fragments were categorized as attractive if their ratings were positive and 
unattractive if they were negative.). In contrast, participants made predictions in phase 2 and 
evaluated the whole shirts in phase 3 on a 101-point scale (0 = “Very Ugly” and 100 = “Very 
Attractive”). Figure 2 provides a screenshot for the prediction task as well as some sample 
stimuli. 
----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 2 about here  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Results 
Table 2 provides the means on the following measures for each type of fragments: 1) 
attractiveness rating for fragments, 2) predicted liking from fragments, 3) evaluation of the 
whole shirt, and 4) discrepancy for each prediction (= predicted liking from fragments – 
evaluation of the whole shirt).  
----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 about here  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Influence of Fragment Attractiveness. Mirroring the findings in study 1, fragment 
evaluations had a strong influence on predicted liking, β = 5.11, t(4427) = 13.46, p < .0001, R2 = 
.39. The effect of fragment evaluations was significantly stronger for attractive fragments than 
for unattractive ones, F(1, 4426) = 11.20, p < .001. The same anchoring effect was also observed 
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for evaluations of the whole, though as in study 1, the effect was weaker than for predicted 
likings, β = 4.21, t(4427) = 9.07, p < .0001, R2 = .36. The difference in β’s was statistically 
significant, F(1, 8840) = 2.95, p < .05. Consistent with these findings, fragment evaluations had 
higher correlations with predicted likings (r = .51) than with experienced likings (r = .37), paired 
t(83) = 6.39, p < .01. This pattern of results was evident among 78% of the participants.  
In addition, this anchoring effect was also evident in discrepancy between predictions and 
actual likings of the whole products, β = .84, t(4426) = 4.28, p < .05, R2 = .10. Consistent with 
the results of study 1, the data indicated that the discrepancy was more pronounced for attractive 
than for unattractive fragments (M = 8.92 vs. 3.29), F(1, 84) = 17.25, p < .0001. However, unlike 
study 1, predicted likings generally tended to exceed evaluations of whole products, even when 
fragments were considered unappealing (see Table 2). This was due to the surprisingly low 
evaluations of the completed shirts.  
Effects of Fragment Familiarity. We hypothesized that fragment familiarity would 
moderate the anchoring effect in predicted likings. Consistent with this prediction, the data 
revealed a significant fragment familiarity x fragment attractiveness interaction on predicted 
liking, F(1, 4426) = 6.35, p < .01. Specifically, fragment attractiveness had a significantly larger 
influence on predicted likings for familiar fragments (β = 5.95, t(2452) = 11.88, p < .0001, R2 = 
.46) than for unfamiliar ones (β = 4.04, t(1974) = 8.96, p < .0001, R2 = .37), F(1, 4426) = 7.13, p 
< .01. This moderating effect of fragment familiarity was not observed for evaluations of the 
whole (p > .2).  
Similarly, fragment familiarity significantly increased discrepancy between predictions 
and evaluations of the whole products (M = 8.03 vs. 3.31), F(1, 84) = 9.84, p < .01. That is, 
compared to their actual evaluation of the whole, respondents held significantly more optimistic 
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expectations about the product for familiar fragments than for unfamiliar ones. This finding is in 
support of our prediction.  
 Response Times. Using log-transformed response time data, we replicated the differential 
effect of fragment valence on response latencies uncovered in Study 1. Attractive fragments were 
associated with longer response times than unattractive ones (M = 3.41 vs. 3.01 seconds), F(1, 
84) = 18,65, p < .0001. This is consistent with the finding that anchoring effects were stronger 
for attractive than for unattractive fragments.  
Discussion 
In Study 2 the task setting differed from that in the previous study in two notable ways: 
participants were provided with less visualization guidance when making forecasts, and different 
affective response scale were used to reduce the ease of recall of fragment ratings at the time 
forecasts were made. Despite these differences, we replicated the key findings of the earlier 
study. The more important contribution of the study, however, was that it provided more direct 
support for the hypothesis that extrapolation judgments were made through an anchoring-and-
adjustment mechanism by finding that the strength of fragment carry-over effects was moderated 
by participants’ familiarity with the fragment. The more familiar the fragment, the greater 
difficulty participants seemed to have looking beyond their immediate affective responses to the 
fragment to imagine how they would respond to it in a new context (here, in a shirt pattern).  
 An obvious limitation of the study, however, is that fragment familiarity is but one of a 
number of factors that are predicted to moderate anchoring effects both across consumers and 
within consumers over time. As noted earlier, one source of individual variation may be 
visualization skills: consumers with greater visualization skills are better able to picture 
completed images in their mind and thus should be much less susceptible to the biasing effect of 
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initial fragments. Likewise, one might expect extrapolation processes to vary over time for 
consumers due to both situational changes and learning. Specifically, if visualization is hindered 
by cognitive load as we theorized, we should expect the strength of the anchoring bias to vary 
depending on the ability of the consumer to narrowly focus on the task: a consumer might form 
accurate anticipatory judgments of the appeal of a room color when contemplated in a quiet 
show room, but poor judgments when the choice is made under time pressure in a busy Home 
Depot. Finally, there may also be a long-term learning effect: the more experience consumers 
have in performing mental extrapolation tasks and observing their own errors, the less their 
judgments will be prone to anchoring biases. These predictions were tested in study 3. 
Study 3 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty-six college students were recruited in a wall paper 
prediction task similar to that described in Study 1. The task was part of a 40-minute long 
experimental session that included other unrelated studies. Each participant received $10 for 
their participation. Six participants did not complete all parts of the study and their responses 
were excluded from the analysis.  
Procedure. The study consisted of three phases. Participants first went through a short 
training session (see details in the Design section below), followed by the prediction task and 
measures of processing style. In the prediction task, participants were first shown a series of four 
wall paper fragments that varied in attractiveness as determined by results from study 1. For each 
fragment, participants were asked to indicate how attractive they anticipated a wall paper to be 
with that fragment on a 15-point scale (1 = “Very Ugly” and 15 = “Very Attractive”). After a 
filler task, they were shown on the computer screen the wall papers constructed with each of the 
 23
fragments and were asked to evaluate the wall papers on the same 15-point scale. The same set 
of dependent measures as in study 1 were collected. Finally, participants completed the style of 
processing (SOP) questionnaire that measured their preference for and hence skills in processing 
visual and verbal stimuli. The style of processing questionnaire was taken from Childers, 
Houston, and Heckler (1985), which has been shown to have good reliability and validity. The 
questionnaire was labeled as a separate study that was not related to the previous tasks.  
Design. The study included three between-subjects factors: training, cognitive load, and 
visualization skills. During the training session, those in the training condition made predictions 
for five fragments and then evaluated the whole wall paper immediately after making each 
prediction. Those in the control (or no training) condition only evaluated the whole wall papers 
without viewing their respective fragments. Cognitive load was imposed for half of participants 
during the prediction task. The procedure was as follows: before showing each fragment, the 
screen first showed a five-letter string (all in uppercase) for four seconds. The on-screen 
instruction asked participants to memorize the letter string as accurately as possible and also told 
them that they would be asked to recall the letter string after each prediction. A random letter 
string was selected for each fragment. After the letter string disappeared from the screen, the 
fragment with the prediction question would appear on the screen. Once a participant had made 
his or her prediction, the screen would ask the participant to key in the letter string that had 
appeared on the screen prior to the fragment. The other half of participants were not shown the 
letter strings. Processing style was measured through the style of processing scale. The scale 
consists of two subscales: visual subscale and verbal subscale, each with eleven statements. 
Participants indicated the degree to which each statement described themselves on a 4-point 
Likert scale (1 = “Always true” and 4 = “Always false”). Visual and verbal scores were 
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calculated for each participant by summing up the eleven items for each subscale. Some items 
were reverse coded so that higher scores on each subscale indicate greater preference for each 
processing style. In addition, fragment attractiveness was manipulated within-subjects as each 
participant viewed two attractive and two unattractive fragments. Fragments were selected from 
those used in study 1 and the manipulation of attractiveness was based on participants’ ratings in 
study (M = 8.7 vs. 4.5 for attractive and unattractive fragments, respectively), F(1, 43) = 78.80, p 
< .0001. Figure 2 (lower panel) shows the fragments used in study 3. 
Results 
Preliminaries. Overall, participants in the cognitive load condition correctly recalled 71% 
of the letter strings, indicating that the cognitive load manipulation was not ignored by 
participants. Recall accuracy did not affect participants’ performance on the extrapolation task. 
The style of processing measures also achieved satisfactory reliability, Cronbach α = .77 and .81 
for visual and verbal subscales, respectively. Moreover, the two subscales were uncorrelated, r = 
.10, p > .2. Since verbal scores did not have any significant effect on any of the dependent 
measures, it was not included in the analyses reported below. Participants were median split into 
two groups with high and low visual scores (M = 35.4 vs. 29.0), t(116) = 14.26, p < .0001, who 
will be henceforward referred to as visualizers and non-visualizers. The short training exercise 
had no significant effect (ps > .3) on any of the dependent measures, an issue we will return to in 
the discussion. Thus, responses were collapsed across the training conditions for the analyses 
reported below. Adding the variable for training condition did not affect the results reported here. 
Table 3 provides the mean responses by treatment conditions.  
----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 3 about here  
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---------------------------------------------------- 
As expected, evaluations of the wholes revealed only a main effect of fragment 
attractiveness (M = 8.37 and 6.45 for attractive and unattractive fragments, respectively), F(1, 
116) = 55.14, p < .0001. Cognitive load and visualization skills did not affect the whole 
evaluations. Similarly, predicted likings were significantly influenced by fragment attractiveness, 
F(1, 116) = 421.04, p < .0001. Congruence between predictions and evaluations of the whole 
products (i.e., predicted liking – actual evaluation of the whole) showed a significant effect of 
fragment attractiveness (M = 1.76 and -.74 for attractive and unattractive fragments, 
respectively), F(1, 116) = 231.20, p < .0001, replicating the results from earlier studies.  
Moderating Role of Cognitive Load. Cognitive load did not influence evaluations of the 
wholes (p > .3) but the data revealed a significant fragment attractiveness x cognitive load 
interaction in predicted likings, F(1, 116) = 4.02, p < .05. Specifically, fragment attractiveness 
had a stronger influence on predicted likings when the decision maker was under cognitive load 
(M = 10.45 vs. 5.46 for attractive and unattractive fragments) than in the no-load condition (M = 
9.80 vs. 5.97).  
A similar pattern emerged from the data on the congruence between predicted likings and 
actual evaluations of the whole products, F(1, 116) = 5.05, p < .05. The discrepancy was stronger 
in the cognitive load condition (M = 1.97 vs. -.87 for attractive and unattractive fragments) than 
in the no-load condition (M = 1.57 vs. -.68).  
Moderating Role of Visualization Skills. The data also revealed a marginally significant 
fragment attractiveness x visualization skills interaction in predicted likings, F(1, 116) = 3.76, p 
< .10. Specifically, the influence of fragment attractiveness on predicted likings was more muted 
for visualizers (M = 9.98 vs. 5.81 for attractive and unattractive fragments) than for non-
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visualizers (M = 10.33 vs. 5.57). Likewise, visualizers also displayed higher congruence between 
predicted likings and actual evaluations of the whole products (M = 1.44 vs. -.72 for attractive 
and unattractive fragments) than did non-visualizers (M = 2.16 vs. -.91). The visualization skill x 
fragment attractiveness interaction was significant, F(1, 116) = 5.47, p < .05. These results 
confirmed the hypothesis that skills at visualization helped reduce the decision bias in the present 
task. They also suggest that the experts among our participants followed rather similar decision 
strategies as their more novice counterparts.  
Response Times. Mirroring previous results, participants on average spent more time on 
attractive fragments than on unattractive ones in the absence of cognitive load (M = 3.80 vs. 3.16 
seconds), F(1, 116) = 11.12, p < .001. As may be expected, cognitive load significantly increased 
the response time for the prediction task (M = 4.42 and 3.48 seconds), F(1, 116) = 13.84, p < 
.0001. In contrast, we found no effect on response time of processing style (M = 3.91 vs. 3.89 
seconds for visualizers and non-visualizers, p > .9). One interpretation of this latter finding is that 
it suggests that the greater accuracy achieved by participants with greater visualization skills 
accrued to more efficient—rather than simply more—cognitive elaboration. 
Discussion 
Study 3 examined the effect of three factors that were hypothesized to influence the 
accuracy of mental extrapolations and the use of anchoring strategy: training (or experience) in 
mental extrapolation judgments, cognitive load during predictions, and visualization skills. We 
predicted that training and preference for processing visual stimuli would lead to superior 
performance at the mental extrapolation task whereas cognitive load would have the opposite 
effect. The results were largely consistent with these expectations. Cognitive load had a 
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significant detrimental effect on judgment accuracy while increasing the decision time, and 
visualizers exhibited smaller errors in the task than non-visualizers.  
Task experience, however, did not produce the expected beneficial effect for our 
participants. Two factors may have contributed to the null effect. First, the training exercise may 
be too short and insufficient (each participant had only five trials), especially given that our 
participants were likely to have had little prior experience in wall paper purchases. Expertise is 
typically a product of extensive experience and thinking; thus the limited experience provided in 
the training exercise may not be enough to make an appreciable increase in our participants’ 
expertise. Secondly, the limited learning that participants may have gathered from the training 
exercise may be specific to the training stimuli, instead of any general theory about how the 
visual appeal of a fragment relate to the overall appeal of a wall paper. For example, after 
viewing how a pattern of bubbles was transformed into a wall paper, a consumer may take away 
the lesson about how to extrapolate a bubbles pattern in the future, instead of a rule of thumb 
about how to extrapolate patterns in general. Decision makers tend to treat each decision as a 
unique case, which inhibits effective learning and development of true expertise in the 
extrapolation task (Tversky & Kaheman, 1986). Thus, the issue of how consumers may develop 
expertise in these extrapolation judgments remains unresolved.  
General Discussion 
This paper took a first step toward understanding the psychological basis of a common, 
but under-researched, form of consumer inference: predicting the likely appeal of whole product 
images from small sample fragments. Three studies provided evidence that such judgments are 
often marked by an anchoring bias in which predicted evaluations of wholes are excessively 
influenced by the localized appeal of fragments. As a result, there is a tendency to make overly 
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optimistic predictions about the appeal of wholes made from attractive fragments and overly 
pessimistic predictions about the appeal of wholes made from unattractive fragments. We find, 
however, that this bias is not necessarily a universal: its strength is moderated by situational and 
interpersonal factors, such as the perceived familiarity of the fragment, the cognitive load that 
accompanies the extrapolation task, and visualization skills of the decision maker.  
These findings hold several implications for marketers whose businesses require 
consumers to engage in such extrapolation tasks such as home improvement stores and apparel 
catalogs. First, the prevalence of forecast errors substantiates the common intuition that mental 
extrapolation is not something we naturally do well. How can mental extrapolation judgments be 
improved? The simplest, of course, is to provide visualization aids, such as those we described at 
the outset (e.g., the tools at the Dutch Boy website). But even if such aids are infeasible the 
current work suggests that predictive accuracy might be improved by designing retail 
environments that are more conducive to visualization. For example, retailers could reduce the 
detrimental effects of cognitive load simply by reducing the number of fragments being 
considered by consumers and encouraging them to take samples with them outside the store. 
Likewise, it might be possible for retailers to encourage more accurate visualization by warning 
consumers against making typical projection errors, such as basing choices on the local appeal of 
a fragment.  
While the current study provides initial insights into how consumers make mental 
extrapolation judgments, it is important to emphasize that the data come from a task setting that 
simplified many of the complex features that arise in real world extrapolation judgments. For 
example, one aspect of visual extrapolation judgments that arises in the real world that we 
controlled for here was the contaminating effect of the context in which a fragment is first 
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viewed. When consumers buy furniture, for example, the challenge they face is not only 
imagining what a piece of furniture would look like in one’s home, but also parsing out the 
potential contaminating influence of the appeal of the showroom in which the piece is first 
viewed. The effect of such initial context, however, could cut two ways. On one hand, viewing a 
piece in an attractive model living room might be hypothesized to amplify optimism biases since 
the holistic attractiveness of the room may carry over to independent impressions of the piece. 
On the other hand, the presence of a living room context may aid consumers’ attempts to 
visualize the piece in their own homes. Thus, one interest topic for future research might thus is 
to examine the flip-side of the problem we considered here, namely, the ability of consumers to 
form accurate impressions of the independent appeal of fragments upon seeing them in 
completed wholes.  
Likewise, it would be interesting to investigate the degree to which the findings 
uncovered here generalize to other extrapolation tasks, such as judgments about the likely 
attractiveness of movies from trailers, software from limited-capability demonstration versions, 
and food items from taste samples. What makes such tasks interesting is that they require 
consumers to form more complex, dynamic, models of wholes than that which was required here 
(e.g., imagining how enjoyable the elements shown in the trailer would be extended to 120 
minutes in a whole film). While we suspect that such judgments will be again be prone to 
anchoring biases (e.g., entertaining trailers would give rise to overly optimistic forecasts of film 
quality), predictions of dynamic wholes might also be influenced by psychological factors that 
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Liking of the 
Whole* 
C. Experienced 
Liking of the 
Whole* 
D. Discrepancy  
(B - C) 
All 7.08 6.34 6.16 0.18 
(N = 792) (3.83) (3.87) (3.81) (3.61) 
Unattractive 4.27 3.82 4.73 -0.91 
(N = 385) (2.60) (2.75) (3.31) (3.14) 
Attractive 9.73 8.71 7.51 1.20 
(N = 407) (2.75) (3.22) (3.77) (3.72) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. N = # of observations. 



















(B – C) 
Attractive Unfamiliar 2.04 44.84 39.30 6.12 
 (N = 713) (0.97) (28.86) (30.81) (26.96) 
 Familiar 2.03 44.75 34.60 10.33 
 (N = 1435) (0.95) (25.72) (28.22) (25.61) 
Unattractive Unfamiliar -1.93 21.09 19.38 1.78 
 (N = 1331) (0.82) (23.54) (23.07) (23.42) 
 Familiar -1.81 18.95 14.07 5.09 
 (N = 1106) (0.80) (21.42) (19.06) (22.23) 
 
Notes: 
a Standard deviations are in parentheses. N = # of observations.  
b Measured on a 7-point scale (-3 to +3) 

















(A - B) 
Non-
Visualizers No Load Unattractive 6.18 6.82 -0.64 
 (N = 52)  (2.31) (3.19) (2.69) 
  Attractive 9.94 7.94 2.00 
   (3.00) (3.24) (3.60) 
 Load Unattractive 4.98 6.14 -1.16 
 (N = 52)  (2.36) (3.18) (2.14) 
  Attractive 10.72 8.40 2.32 
   (2.43) (3.68) (3.98) 
Visualizers No Load Unattractive 5.79 6.30 -0.52 
 (N = 56)  (2.80) (3.36) (2.96) 
  Attractive 9.68 8.54 1.14 
   (3.20) (3.57) (3.25) 
 Load Unattractive 5.84 6.53 -0.69 
 (N = 60)  (2.74) (3.76) (2.22) 
  Attractive 10.23 8.55 1.69 
   (2.88) (3.75) (3.77) 
 





Figure 1: Example of fragment (left) and referent wall paper image (right) with the associated 
response scale and sample fragments (lower panel) in study 1 





Figure 1: Example of fragment (left) and referent wall paper image (right) with the associated 





Figure 2: Screenshot for the prediction task and sample stimuli in study 2 
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